Real trade-weighted value of the dollar holds, despite fall against the yen and mark by David M. Gould
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“If You Build It, They Will Come”
Texas’ 1980s real estate boom
followed the oil boom that started
in the late 1970s. Oil prices spiraled
upward between 1978 and 1981 and
spurred job growth across the state.
People and firms flocked to Texas,
and construction activity soared. But
much of the economic growth was
based on speculative expectations.
Oil was king, and “$85 by ’85” be-
came a rallying cry among investors.
Oil prices edged down in 1982,
but even that, coupled with the
spillover effects of a national reces-
sion, didn’t quell construction growth
in Texas. Home and apartment
building surged, and construction
of offices and other nonresidential
structures remained at very high
levels (Chart 1). The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was one
likely reason construction continued
to increase. The act created signifi-
cant tax breaks for apartment and
office building investors. Basically,
the new law gave investors and
builders incentives to build without
much regard for demand.
Another culprit in the 1980s real
estate buildup may have been a so-
called lending frenzy. Two major
banking laws were passed in the
early 1980s giving financial institu-
tions a larger pool of funds to lend
to real estate investors.1 These laws,
along with a monetary easing that
initiated a decline in interest rates,
added to banks’ liquidity. Although
these were national events, the
lending frenzy was probably worse
in Texas. Texas lending institutions
that had been badly burned by
energy loans in the 1970s were
searching for new investments, and
they chose real estate.
Unrealistic expectations of oil
prices and economic growth, tax
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en years ago, the Texas real
estate and construction indus-
tries were booming. But by 1986, a
plunge in oil prices, a statewide
recession and federal tax law re-
visions had sent the state’s construc-
tion activity and real estate values
into a free fall. What was once the
land of oil derricks and construc-
tion cranes had become the land
of see-through skyscrapers and
vacant apartment buildings.
After the crash, construction and
real estate activity grew little for the
rest of the decade. Demand for real
estate was stagnant, and construc-
tion was next to nil. In the 1990s,
however, activity began to pick up.
Since 1991, demand for almost all
types of real estate has rebounded,
resulting in rising occupancy and
rents for apartments, office build-
ings and retail space. The higher
demand for real estate has also
boosted construction activity and
employment. But is this growth
solid, or is the Texas real estate
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of extreme oversupply. As Chart 2
shows, office vacancy rates rose
rapidly during the early 1980s, even
as construction continued. Exces-
sive building during the boom
made the bust especially painful. In
1986, oil prices tumbled, the state
entered a recession and a new tax
law eliminated certain real estate
tax shelters. Construction activity
plummeted to pre-1980 levels.
Where Are We Now?
In the 1990s, signs of life have
returned to the Texas real estate and
construction sectors. In fact, 1994
was the best year for these Texas in-
dustries since the boom days of the
early 1980s. Last year, employment
in the real estate-related sectors of
the economy rose by 42,300 jobs,
almost 17 percent of total Texas
employment growth.2 In addition,
contracts for new residential and
nonresidential construction rose 15
percent in 1994, and real estate
values and rents began to pick up.
A rebound in the residential
market led the real estate industry’s
recovery. Growing demand for
housing and diminishing inventories
led to an 84-percent increase in single-
family home construction from
1990 through 1994. Also in the 1990s,
many who bought homes at the
1980s peak could finally breathe a
sigh of relief as home prices began
to rise. As Chart 3 indicates, average
home prices have surpassed their
1980s peak in most major Texas
cities. The most dramatic increase
has been in Austin, where 1994
prices reached $120,800, 9.6 percent
above their 1986 peak. Apartment
demand also surged. Texas apart-
ment permits rose more than 100
percent in 1993 and 60 percent in
1994, and rents for new apartments
have reached historical highs.
The real estate recovery is not
limited to the housing sector. The
market for nonresidential real estate,
including retail, industrial and office
space, also has improved. As demand
increased and vacancy rates began
to fall, nonresidential construction
began to pick up in 1992 and took
off in 1993 and 1994. Much of the
growth is a result of retail and in-
dustrial construction.
Even the office market has made
a comeback. Although construction
levels remain low, rising demand
for office space has caused vacancy
rates to fall. In 1987, Austin had the
highest office vacancy rate ever
recorded in the state of Texas—39.5
percent. By December 1994, Austin
had the lowest office vacancy rate of
any major Texas city—12.4 percent.
Dallas’ and Houston’s vacancy rates
remain higher than the national
average but have edged down in the
1990s.
On Solid Ground
Texas’ construction and real estate
sectors have come a long way since
the bust, and the outlook is posi-
tive. The factors driving growth in the
1990s are based on the fundamental
strengths of the Texas economy,
unlike the more speculative factors
that drove the 1980s boom.
One of the most important influ-
ences behind the construction and
real estate recovery is Texas’ strong
rate of economic growth. In 1994,
the Texas economy expanded at a
faster pace than the nation for the
sixth straight year. Unlike the ex-
pansion of the late 1970s and early
1980s, Texas’ economic growth to-
day is broad-based and not overly
dependent on a single industry.
Rising job opportunities and
numerous business relocations have
drawn workers to Texas, boosting
the demand for housing. In addi-
tion, the state’s lower costs of living
have enabled many newcomers to
purchase homes or live in luxury
apartments. Despite rising prices in
recent years, home prices and apart-
ment rents are below the national
average in most Texas cities. The
average price of a Dallas home, for
example, remains about 10 percent
below the national average.3
Texas’ central location and prox-
imity to Mexico are also contributing
to the real estate sector’s strength.
Numerous companies have moved
manufacturing facilities and distri-
bution hubs to Texas. For example,
Nokia Mobile Phones, Riddell
Athletic Footwear, Nestle and Zenith
have all chosen Alliance Airport in
Fort Worth for national or regional
distribution centers. Similarly, El
Paso’s industrial warehouse space is
97.5-percent full, a result of increased
demand from manufacturers choos-
ing to locate near Mexico.
In the 1990s, builders, investors
and bankers appear to be taking
care not to repeat the mistakes of
the 1980s. Homebuilders are watch-
ing buyer demand, and when home
sales slowed last fall, builders cut
back on starts, keeping inventories
manageable. Also, despite much
new apartment construction, vacancy
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different. The popular press and
policymakers now often single out
the budget deficit as a major cause
of a long laundry list of economic
woes, including recessions, unem-
ployment, inflation, high interest
rates, trade deficits and gyrations in
the dollar’s value. They regard the
view that the deficit is a serious
problem requiring discipline and
tough legislation as self-evident.
Economists, in contrast, while
certainly far from a consensus, tend
to view the economic effects of
deficits as small. This article explores
the issues of the measurement and
economic effects of deficits and asks
if there are reasons to worry about
the state of government finance,
even if deficits by themselves have
no major harmful economic effects.
Measures of the Deficit
There are numerous measures
of the government deficit. Many do
not use sensible accounting prin-
ciples and therefore are prone to
be misleading. Unfortunately, the
most popular measure is probably
the most misleading. This is the
unified federal budget deficit, the
simple difference between total
federal government outlays and
receipts. One version of this measure
counts spending and receipts that
have been deemed “off-budget” by
Congress. The major off-budget
item is Social Security. Since the
Social Security trust fund is cur-
rently running a large surplus, the
total deficit is substantially less than
the on-budget deficit ($203 billion
versus $259 billion in fiscal year
1994). However, this will change in
the future as the population ages
and Social Security payments be-
come larger than the payroll tax
receipts that finance them.
Official deficit measures are
misleading for a variety of reasons.
First, they cover only the federal
government, not state and local
governments. By virtue of the annual
federal grants they receive, state
and local governments generally
run a surplus—$28 billion in 1994
after including federal grants of
$210 billion.
Second, government outlays and
revenues are highly sensitive to the
level of economic activity. The
structural deficit, the deficit after
temporary business-cycle effects are
discounted, adjusts for the lower
tax revenues and higher payouts of
unemployment insurance that occur
when unemployment is high. The
structural deficit is calculated assum-
ing that the unemployment rate is
at a benchmark level, termed the
nonaccelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU), currently
defined to be at 6 percent. In 1994,
with the average unemployment
rate slightly above this level, the
structural deficit was estimated to be
$187 billion, or $16 billion less than
the official federal deficit including
off-budget items.
Third, official measures ignore
the effects of inflation and changing
interest rates on government in-
debtedness. Inflation acts to reduce
the real value of publicly held gov-
ernment debt, just as it reduces the
real value of an individual’s mort-
gage debt. This “inflation tax” on
government bondholders should be
recognized as revenue to the gov-
ernment. Similarly, when market
interest rates rise, the market value
of publicly held government debt
falls, again leading to a gain for the
government that should be counted
as revenue. Inflation and rising
interest rates thus reduce properly
measured government deficits by
reducing the real value of outstand-
ing government debt, while falling
prices and interest rates increase
deficits by increasing the debt’s real
value.
Because the stock of outstanding
government debt held by the public
is large, these interest and inflation
adjustments can dwarf the official
budget numbers. For example, rising
interest rates throughout 1994 re-
duced the market value of the pub-
licly held outstanding debt by $250
billion, while 1994’s modest inflation
rate reduced the real value of the
debt by another $72 billion. Count-
R
ecent legislative proposals in
Congress could have significant
impacts on the government’s budget
deficit in coming years. On the one
hand, the tax cut package passed
by the House of Representatives
could well increase the deficit, at
least in the short term, if passed into
law. On the other hand, Congress
is considering numerous proposals
to narrow the deficit (including a
balanced budget amendment).
This legislative activity has re-
focused attention on government
budget deficits, how they are meas-
ured and their effects on economic
performance. This article summa-
rizes the vast academic literature on
the measurement and economic
effects of the deficit. The focus is
primarily on the economic effects
of the deficit per se as opposed
those of government spending or
taxation separately, although there
is considerable research on each of
these topics that should not be
ignored.
Few issues have received as
much attention as the U.S. budget
deficit. The extensive literature about
its causes and consequences ranges
from academic treatises to popular
commentary. Not too long ago,
government deficits were widely
regarded as a useful way to main-
tain the economy at full employ-
ment during times when recession
threatened. Today, however, the
popular view of deficits is starkly4
ing these reductions in the value of
the debt as government revenue
turns a deficit of $159 billion (after
adjusting for state and local govern-
ment accounts and business-cycle
effects) into a surplus of $163 billion.
Finally, official forecasts of deficit
figures ignore potentially vast
amounts of future outlays. The gov-
ernment has large unfunded obli-
gations for federal employee and
military retirement programs and
other contingent obligations such
as loan and credit guarantees. As the
savings and loan crisis illustrates,
some of these federal guarantees
can turn into large cash outlays for
the federal government. Estimating
precisely these potential liabilities
and their future likelihood is ex-
tremely difficult. However, it is
clear that they have been growing
rapidly in recent years. The U.S.
Treasury estimates that the actuarial
deficit for federal and military
retirement programs (excluding
Social Security) more than tripled
from 1980 to 1993 when it sur-
passed $2 trillion.1
Charts 1 and 2 present two esti-
mates of the budget surplus or deficit
that attempt to address some of
these measurement problems, along
with the official measure of the
federal budget deficit including off-
budget items. One estimate, the all
government, structural budget, in-
cludes the budgets of state and local
governments and is adjusted for
cyclical variations in the economy.
Because it adjusts for state and
local finances and for business-
cycle effects, this measure is a good
indicator of the intended budgetary
stance of the government sector, as
legislated by Congress and state
and local governments. The second
estimate adjusts the all government,
structural budget for inflation and
interest rate effects. Because this
measure indicates the change in the
net debt of the government held by
the public, it is a good indicator of
the effective stance of fiscal policy.
However, because inflation and
changes in interest rates are beyond
government’s immediate control,
this measure is not indicative of the
intended stance of fiscal policy.
The two measures provide a
distinctly different impression of the
state of government finance than
does the official measure. In each
year since 1980, the all government,
structural deficit has been between
about $50 billion and $100 billion
less than the official federal deficit.
After accounting for inflation and
interest-rate changes, the deficit
becomes even narrower and the
budget actually shows a surplus for
a few years since 1962, most recently
in 1994.
One also gets different impres-
sions of the deficit by looking at it
in dollar terms (Chart 1) and as a
percentage of gross domestic pro-
duct (GDP) (Chart 2). The deficit
in relation to our capacity to pay it
off (in other words, as a share of
GDP) is the more appropriate meas-
ure for calculating the size of the
deficit. As a share of GDP, recent
deficits don’t look much worse than
those of the late 1960s. The source
of today’s concern over the deficit
may therefore involve an aspect
of government obligations that
has grown dramatically in recent
years—that is, the myriad number
of future or contingent obligations
taken on by the federal govern-
ment. These have the potential to
impose a huge real cost on govern-
ment finances at some unspecified
time in the future.
Economic Effects of Deficits
There are four main schools of
thought with regard to the eco-
nomic effects of budget deficits.
The irrelevance school, led by
Robert Barro, argues that deficits
have no macroeconomic effects:
financing government expenditures
by borrowing is exactly equivalent
to financing via taxes in terms of
the effect on the economy. This
argument, labelled the Ricardian
equivalence proposition, runs as
follows: if government expenditures
are financed by borrowing instead
of by taxes, taxpayers will have
greater current after-tax incomes.
However, they will not spend their
extra income; they will save it to
pay the future taxes necessary to
service the resulting government
debt or leave it to their children to
pay those taxes. Government debt
financing will thus induce no more
spending than tax financing. And it
will induce no less saving than tax
financing, since the increased public
dissaving of the higher deficit will
be exactly offset by the increased
private saving needed to pay future
taxes.
Chart 1
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The irrelevance school does not
claim that government spending
and taxation are without economic
effects; in particular, it allows for the
possibility that high levels of gov-
ernment expenditure and high mar-
ginal tax rates can blunt incentives
to work and save, thereby lowering
long-term economic growth. All it
claims is that the deficit per se has
no economic effects.
The irrelevance school has had
a major impact on the academic
debate over the economic effects of
deficits, although much less so on
the debate among policymakers.
This may be because the theory
makes perhaps unrealistic assump-
tions about how individuals react
to tax cuts and make bequests to
their children. However, this does
not necessarily mean that Ricardian
equivalence is not a good approxi-
mation of economic reality; for
that we have to look at the em-
pirical evidence.
The traditional Keynesian analysis
of deficits claims that a deficit adds
to the purchasing power and aggre-
gate demand of the private sector
and, through the multiplier process,
changes aggregate income and
output by a multiple of the initial
change. Deficits are therefore expan-
sive and surpluses contractive. In
this analysis, deficits will only in-
crease real output to the extent the
unemployment rate is above the
NAIRU. Increasing the deficit when
the economy is at or below the
NAIRU will have no effect on output
but merely increase inflation. Deficits
can therefore have beneficial effects
if they are properly managed to
keep the economy running at the
highest growth rate consistent with
low inflation.
The monetarist analysis of deficits
claims that a deficit affects the
economy in different ways, depend-
ing on how it is financed. If financed
by printing money, the result is
inflation. If financed through the
issuance of government debt (as
has largely been the case in the
United States), then the effect on
the economy operates through
interest rates. Increases in debt
finance raise real interest rates,
crowding out private investment
and lowering the level of long-run
expected income or normal output.
In this case, while the short-term
effect of debt financed deficits is
expansionary, the long-term effect
may be to lower economic growth.
A final view is that regardless of
the true effects of the deficit on the
economy, deficits matter because
the bond market believes they
matter. If bond market participants
believe the deficit is a good signal
of the current government’s attitude
toward inflation, they may react to
the deficit’s size as an indicator of
future inflation. Some analysts have
linked the strong bond market rallies
in 1986 and 1993 to the passage of
legislation that was viewed as aiding
in a reduction of future deficits.
Considerable recent empirical
work addresses the effects of deficits
on the economy. The results are
mixed. To date, the bottom line of
this research is that if budget deficits
have effects on interest rates or
investment, these effects appear to
be too small to be picked up in
econometric analysis.2 This means
that, while not a literally true descrip-
tion of behavior, the irrelevance
school’s claim that deficits do not
matter might be a good approxima-
tion of reality. Alternatively, open
world capital markets provide a
plausible explanation for the failure
to find large effects of deficits on
interest rates. A country’s deficit is
financed in the world capital market.
If world capital markets are inte-
grated, then risk-adjusted, after-tax
real interest rates are equalized across
countries, and if the U.S. deficits
are small relative to world saving,
then the effect of deficits on interest
rates can be expected to be small.
Conclusions
The general message from econo-
mists is that budget deficits, prop-
erly measured, do not appear to be
any more serious today than they
were 30 years ago, with the impor-
tant caveat that there has been a
dramatic increase in the federal
government’s potential future liabili-
ties. The magnitude of this liability
is impossible to evaluate precisely
but may impose a considerable
burden on government finances at
some time in the future. Budget
deficits of the magnitude that the
United States has experienced in
the recent past (ranging up to about
5 percent of GDP when properly
measured) appear to have major
economic effects only if they are
financed by printing money or per-
Chart 2
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ceived as signifying a more liberal
attitude toward inflation.
Does this mean we should not
worry about the government budget?
Absolutely not. The empirical work
has focused on periods when the
deficit has been under 5 percent of
GDP. Deficits larger than this could
have more painful and more obvious
economic effects. Furthermore,
although the deficit per se may
have no perverse economic effects,
there is considerable evidence that
the level and composition of gov-
ernment spending and taxation do.
For example, the share of the
economy’s resources commanded
by the public sector has risen by
about one-third since 1945. Gov-
ernment spending now makes up
more than one-third of total GDP.
To the extent that this increased
government spending has crowded
out private expenditures, there is a
real danger that resources have
become increasingly misallocated,
thereby lowering long-term growth.
Is the marginal value of a dollar
transferred to government and
spent by the public sector as great
as it would be if left in the hands of
private citizens? If not, then govern-
ment has grown too large. Empirical
work suggests that the private
sector values the marginal dollar
spent by the government only about
one-fourth as much as a dollar left
in the hands of the private sector.
To the extent that growth in the
public sector is a function of a
budget process that allows the gov-
ernment to practice deficit spend-
ing, the budget process may be in
need of change.
In addition, the structure of taxa-
tion and the composition of govern-
ment spending may have important
effects on growth. High marginal
tax rates lower long-term economic
growth by blunting incentives to
work and save. Low levels of public
investment in physical and human
capital may mean insufficient spend-
ing on the physical infrastructure,
education and training that are
essential to a healthy economy.
Overall, the weight of evidence
from economic research suggests
that the ongoing debate over balanc-
ing the budget would be better
focused, instead, on the larger issue
of the proper role and size of gov-
ernment in the economy.
—Stephen Prowse
Notes
1 This potential liability dwarfs the cost
to the government of the savings and
loan crisis, which totaled roughly $155
billion over four years.
2 Proponents of the “deficits matter be-
cause bond markets believe they matter”
school argue that such evidence does
not conflict with their hypothesis be-
cause bond markets may believe deficits
matter only at certain times; for example
when the budget deficit is large relative
to GDP by historical standards. Thus,
the bond market may have become
focused on the deficit in the mid-1980s
and early 1990s when the deficit in-
creased. Empirical studies over a long
time period would not pick up this
phenomenon.
Texas’ Real Estate Boom
(Continued from page 2)
1980s forced the industry to impose
strict underwriting standards and
to scrutinize loans more closely.
Despite a recent lending recovery
in Texas and some easing of credit
standards, banks rarely make real
estate loans to developers without
several committed tenants. Simi-
larly, investors are more careful
now. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
removed the tax incentive to invest
in income-losing properties and
reduced the attractiveness of real
estate investments relative to other
types of investments.
Real estate and construction are
cyclical industries and will rise and
fall along with fluctuations in the
national and regional economies.
But because the growth of these
industries in the 1990s seems based
on the fundamental strengths of the
Texas economy, the next downturn
should not trigger another 1980s-
style bust. Today, the real estate
sector’s strength is grounded in
gesting that construction is in line
with demand. While vacancy rates
have come down in the nonresi-
dential sector, increases in specula-
tive building are not evident.
Bankers’ standards for real estate
loans in the 1990s are much tougher
than those of the early 1980s. Texas’
wave of bank failures in the late
economic reality. As long as
developers, bankers and investors
keep demand and supply in balance,
the real estate and construction




1 These laws were the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 and the Garn–St Germain
Depository Institution Act of 1982.
2 In this article, real estate-related employ-
ment includes construction, lumber and
wood products; stone, clay and glass
products; furniture and fixtures, fabri-
cated structural metal products; real
estate; retail sales of construction
materials and home furnishings.
3 Likewise, commercial rents are low in
Texas. The average cost for first-class
Dallas office space at the end of 1994
was $17 per square foot, compared with
$40 per square foot nationally.7
Beyond the Border
W
orld currency markets were shaken
in early March as the nominal value
of the dollar declined to post–World War
II lows against the Japanese yen and the
German mark. From January 1 through
April, the nominal value of the dollar
fell 15.3 percent against the yen and
10.4 percent relative to the mark. Over
approximately the same period, the real
value of the dollar (adjusted for U.S. and
foreign inflation differentials) was down
8.2 percent against the yen and 14 per-
cent against the mark. A looming ques-
tion for the U.S. economy is whether
the decline in the dollar portends higher
U.S. inflation as imports from Japan and
Germany become more expensive.
Over the past 10 years, U.S. consumer
prices have increased nearly 43 per-
cent, while German prices increased 26
percent and Japanese prices increased
only 14 percent. Although the dollar’s
long-term nominal decline against the
yen and mark undoubtedly reflects the
fact that U.S. inflation has been higher
than German and Japanese inflation, the
dollar’s recent decline does not neces-
sarily signal higher future U.S. inflation
resulting from increased import prices.
Despite the dollar’s recent fall against
the yen and mark, the overall real
trade-weighted value of the dollar has
changed only slightly during the past
year. From April 1994 to April 1995, the
Dallas Fed’s Real Trade-Weighted Value
of the Dollar Index (which includes 99
countries) fell only 5.7 percent (Chart 1).
The Real Trade-Weighted Value of the
Dollar Index is calculated by weighting
each country’s dollar exchange rate by
that country’s share of total U.S. trade
(exports plus imports) and then adjust-
ing for inflation differentials between
that country and the United States.
Consequently, movements in the real
trade-weighted value of the dollar
approximate changes in the overall
purchasing power of the dollar.
The real trade-weighted value of the
dollar has remained relatively stable
because of offsetting movements in the
dollar’s value across our largest trading
partners. Although the dollar has been
declining against the yen and mark, it
has been appreciating against the Mexi-










Real Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar Against Select Regions￿
(Percentage change April ’94–April ’95)
against the Canadian dollar and other
currencies. Since April 1994, the dollar
has appreciated 48.1 percent against the
Mexican peso and is unchanged against
the Canadian dollar (map). Canada and
Mexico represent nearly 30 percent of
total U.S. trade, while Japan and Ger-
many account for around 20 percent
of U.S. trade. As a result, the dollar’s
decline against the yen and the mark
has been mitigated by the dollar’s rise
against the peso and Canadian dollar.
Consequently, while U.S. consumers
may see higher prices for imported
German and Japanese products, overall
U.S. prices may not increase that much
because of lower or unchanged prices
for Canadian and Mexican imports.
—David M. Gould
Chart 1
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FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
more information on TIPI, see “The Texas Indus-
trial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic
Review, November 1989). For more information
on the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
On-line economic data and articles are avail-
able on the Dallas Fed’s electronic bulletin board,
FEDFLASH (214-922-5199 or 800-333-1953).
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- Service- New
Index Total Mining tion turing ment Producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
3/95 110.0 119.3 156.4 401.5 1,029.3 1,432.5 4,896.5 7,916.2 1,785.5 684.9
2/95 111.2 119.6 157.0 404.8 1,028.8 1,430.8 4,880.7 7,902.1 1,782.4 684.3
1/95 110.5 118.6 157.0 405.4 1,024.5 1,429.2 4,851.4 7,867.5 1,781.8 681.5
12/94 111.4 118.3 157.8 398.5 1,022.7 1,426.1 4,870.8 7,875.9 1,774.5 675.3
11/94 111.9 118.2 159.7 393.3 1,021.1 1,420.7 4,851.5 7,846.3 1,764.0 674.2
10/94 112.0 118.5 160.7 389.9 1,020.2 1,418.3 4,838.9 7,828.0 1,755.1 669.0
9/94 111.9 118.4 163.1 387.9 1,017.7 1,417.9 4,834.4 7,821.0 1,743.8 664.5
8/94 112.1 118.4 162.9 383.1 1,014.3 1,423.5 4,817.7 7,801.5 1,729.3 658.3
7/94 111.4 118.3 162.5 380.3 1,010.6 1,414.4 4,797.2 7,765.0 1,719.4 660.2
6/94 111.2 118.3 162.8 376.9 1,007.4 1,417.0 4,759.5 7,723.6 1,710.3 655.4
5/94 110.5 118.2 163.2 374.3 1,005.9 1,402.8 4,755.3 7,701.5 1,701.8 651.1
4/94 111.4 118.0 163.9 376.4 1,003.4 1,390.9 4,756.7 7,691.3 1,702.3 649.3
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100









































Net Contributions of Components to Change In Leading Index,￿
December 1994–March 1995
Percent
–2.5 –2 –1.5 –1 –.5 0 .5 1
















*Data are through February 1995.
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After experiencing strong growth in
1994, the Eleventh District economy
has decelerated in 1995. Employment
in Louisiana, New Mexico and Texas
increased 2.4 percent in the first three
months of this year, after rising 4.1
percent last year. A lower value of the
Mexican peso, a slower national economy
and higher interest rates have likely
contributed to slowing the District ex-
pansion. Manufacturing employment
growth remains much stronger in the
District than in the nation.
Slower job growth in service in-
dustries—which make up roughly 80
percent of all jobs in the three-state
region—contributed to the region’s
slower employment gains. In the ser-
vice sector, transportation firms and
retail stores have accounted for much of
the slower employment growth. Weaker
demand for transportation and ware-
housing services led to a 0.9-percent
decline in employment in the first
quarter of 1995, following a 6.1-percent
increase in 1994. Retail trade employ-
ment growth also slowed in the first
quarter, mostly at automotive dealers,
and retail stores selling building materials,
furniture and apparel.
Construction employment fell in Feb-
ruary and March, after higher interest
rates slowed home building in the
second half of 1994. A recent decline in
mortgage rates has boosted contract
values and building permits, however,
suggesting job growth will rebound in
the next few months.
The manufacturing sector has re-
mained strong over the past quarter,
although job growth weakened in
March. Employment gains were slower
in industries that produce construction-
related materials and transportation
equipment, but job growth was strong
for food and kindred products.
Current indicators suggest that
Texas employment growth is still slow-
ing. The Texas Leading Index declined
in March, its fifth decline since peaking
in August 1994. Although most com-
ponents weakened or declined, much
of the index’s recent drop has been
centered in the Texas weighted value
of the dollar.
—Fiona Sigalla